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Research in sustainability science has emphasized that collective action plays a 
critical role in resource governance, resilience and adaptation to various forms of 
environmental change (Adger, 2003; Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstrom, 
2005; Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Endter-Wada & Keenan, 2005; Kurien, 1995; Nelson, 
Adger, & Brown, 2007). Broadly defined as cooperation among individuals, collective 
action is often based on communication, trust, reciprocity, and a shared vision 
(Mosimane, Breen, & Nkhata, 2012; Ostrom, 1998; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Smith, 
2010). Successful coordination among individuals may prevent the scenario Garrett 
Hardin (1968) famously described as the tragedy of the commons, in which shared 
resources are overharvested by rational actors maximizing their personal gains. Four 
decades of research on the commons have largely debunked Hardin’s assumptions by 
highlighting the ability of individuals and communities to self-organize for the 
governance of natural resources (Acheson, 2011a; Agrawal, 2001; Araral, 2009; Ostrom, 
1990; Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, & May, 2013; Ruttan, 2006; 
McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom et al., 2002).  
Common property theory has largely emphasized the role of institutions in 
mediating individual resource use (Berkes, 1996; Ostrom, 1990) and experimental 
research has advanced understanding about other conditions under which such forms of 
collective action are possible (Henrich et al., 2005; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom & Walker, 
2003). However a general theory about individual decision-making within the context of 
common pool resource dilemmas remains poorly developed (Janssen, 2010). Despite the 
wealth of experimental research on collective action and case studies of common 
property institutions, surprisingly little attention has been given to the ways in which 
resource characteristics and ecological dynamics influence individual behavior (Janssen 
2010) or the creation of institutions (Agrawal, 2001; 2002). A more robust understanding 
of human-resource interactions is needed to strengthen theoretical propositions about 
collective action, group formation, and the sustainable governance of the commons.  
The research presented here explores the influence of local civil society 
institutions on human-resource interactions in the commons at two levels in coastal 
Ecuador: 1) the fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), 
bivalve mollusks harvested from the roots of mangrove trees at low tide by artisanal 
fishers; and 2) its broader mangrove wetland habitat. For decades, the conversion of 
mangrove forests for shrimp farming in Ecuador has exacerbated harvesting pressures on 
many small-scale fisheries. Since the 1990s, a thriving civil society sector has grown out 
of grassroots resistance to shrimp aquaculture. At the same time, Ecuador has taken great 
strides in the direction toward participatory sustainable coastal management (Beitl, 2011; 
Guest, 1999; Olsen, Ochoa, & Robadue, 2003; Robadue, 1995). Mangrove deforestation 
rates have begun to subside since the year 2000 and some areas are showing signs of 
recovery (CLIRSEN-PMRC, 2007). Presently, many local fishing associations continue 
to engage in activism concerning the defense of mangroves and some also work 
collaboratively with government agencies to address resource management and 
development issues in artisanal fisheries.  
Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem Beitl  
 3 
Despite the innovative policy interventions and the recovery of mangroves in 
some areas, the fishery for mangrove cockles continues to experience harvesting 
pressures (Mora & Moreno, 2009; Mora, Moreno, & Jurado, 2009; 2011). In 2001, the 
Subsecretaría de Recursos Pesqueros (SRP), a government regulatory agency, prohibited 
the harvest of shells smaller than 45mm in length. These regulations are in line with 
customary norms by which fishers have traditionally left behind smaller shells in the 
mangroves to allow biological processes of larval dispersal, settlement, and growth. 
Members of fishing associations (hereafter referred to as socios) adamantly insist they are 
more “responsible” fishers than non-affiliated cockle collectors because they obey shell 
size regulations and participate in workshops that increase awareness. Some government 
officials believe that mandating all cockle collectors to join associations would address 
problems of overexploitation. But many cockle collectors are wary of institutions and 
prefer not to participate (Beitl, 2012). Verifying popular claims about who engages in 
“responsible fishing” would not only settle the debate and inform fishery policies in 
Ecuador, but also contribute more broadly to theoretical understanding about the complex 
relationship between collective action and the environment.  
This multi-sited comparative case study of two resource systems draws on 
ethnographic and fishery data to explore the general question: how do resource 
characteristics and the institutional context affect people’s behavior toward common pool 
resources? Specifically, I ethnographically explore the emergence of local associations of 
cockle fishers and other “ancestral users” of mangrove resources within the context of 
widespread environmental degradation associated with shrimp farming. I further examine 
how those local institutions influence human-resource interactions by statistically testing 
whether membership explains differences in 1) fishing behavior (measured by the 
average length of shells in each fisher’s catch); and 2) participation in activities that 
promote mangrove conservation (i.e. reforestation, activism). These two measures of 
human-resource interactions represent two different kinds of collective action problems, 
which may partially explain why local institutions successfully encourage participation in 
management regimes that uphold the mangrove commons but seem to have little effect 
on cooperation in the fishery commons. Understanding such mixed effects of collective 
action behaviors in different resource systems further contributes to knowledge about the 
interaction between other outcomes like ecological sustainability, livelihoods, and equity, 
which is of increasing interest in the literature on common pool resource governance 
(Agrawal & Benson, 2011; Persha, Fischer, Chhatre, Agrawal, & Benson, 2010).  
 
2. COLLECTIVE ACTION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT 
 
Global trends of population growth, urbanization, and rising market demand or 
seafood products have been transforming coastal zones and artisanal fisheries throughout 
the developing world for decades. Coastal mangrove forests have been among the most 
vulnerable forest types to such forms of global change for their widespread 
undervaluation that has often led to their conversion to other uses like shrimp farming 
(Alongi, 2002; Cormier-Salem, 2006; FAO, 2007; Martinez-Alier, 2001; Valiela, Bowen, 
& York, 2001). The social and ecological impacts of shrimp aquaculture such as 
landscape transformations, community displacement, livelihood loss, the erosion of 
resource rights, and conflict, have been well-documented in the literature (Cruz-Torres, 
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2000; Deb, 1998; Dewalt, Vergne, & Hardin, 1996; Gunawardena & Rowan, 2005; 
Martinez-Alier, 2001; Meltzoff & LiPuma, 1986; Primavera, 1997; Stonich, 1995; 
Stonich & Vandergeest, 2001; Veuthey & Gerber, 2011). Such chronic environmental 
degradation increases vulnerability in coastal areas and threatens resilience (Adger et al., 
2005), or the ability of a social-ecological system to learn, adapt, reorganize, and 
maintain its identity in the face of change (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2003). However, in 
some places around the world including Ecuador, coastal communities have empowered 
themselves, engaged in collective action, and formed coalitions of resistance to defend 
livelihoods and the environment where property rights have been poorly defined 
(Martinez-Alier, 2001; Stonich & Bailey, 2000; Veuthey & Gerber, 2011).  
 
(a) Civil society as collective action institutions 
 
Civil society plays a pivotal role in environmental issues of the new millennium 
(Little, 1999). It is often well-positioned to negotiate and advocate rights-based 
approaches to resource management and sustainable development, especially in places 
where commercial interests are privileged over local wellbeing (Johnson & Forsyth, 
2002) or where government agencies are unable to adequately meet local needs. On the 
Ecuadorian coast, many civil society organizations were born out of a struggle between 
artisanal fishers and shrimp farmers over access to resources. In the early 1990s, 
extensive mangrove deforestation in Ecuador provoked outrage among activists and 
communities who began to mobilize in response. Muisne, one of the study areas for this 
research in the northern province of Esmeraldas, has been an important center for 
collective action and grassroots resistance to the shrimp industry when a group of youths 
formed a local non-government organization (NGO) in the early 1990s (Veuthey & 
Gerber, 2011). This NGO has played an instrumental role in helping communities 
organize into associations of ancestral users. Now internationally connected, the NGO 
continues to work with associations throughout the Muisne-Cojimíes Estuary to lead 
community development projects, network with other “ancestral user” associations in 
other provinces, and create national and international awareness campaigns for mangrove 
conservation, social justice, and the defense of livelihoods.  
Similarly, in the southern province of El Oro, several communities throughout the 
Archipiélago Jambelí also began organizing in the early 1990s to gain government 
recognition of their “right to work” as artisanal fishers in the face of the rapidly 
expanding shrimp industry. Particularly in the south, one important benefit of creating 
associations and cooperatives has been increased access to government and non-
government agencies for technical and financial assistance, such as loans and subsidies 
for economic development in rural coastal communities. Several local associations are 
now members of an umbrella federation of artisanal fishing organizations of the south, 
which is nested within a larger, national federation that works closely with government 
agencies to organize meetings and events that facilitate participatory practices in fisheries 
and coastal management. Such cross-scale institutional linkages are often considered an 
appropriate approach to managing complex social-ecological systems like fisheries 
(Berkes, 2002).  
In the last decade, local institutions have gained more government and 
international support, which has fostered local empowerment and allowed for new forms 
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of social-ecological change on the Ecuadorian coast. The new Presidential Decree 1391 
calling for a regulation of the shrimp industry will most likely create more opportunities 
for cross-scale collective actions and collaboration between multiple sectors for the 
recuperation of lost mangrove habitat.i Under the new institutional arrangements that 
emerged from this policy, shrimp farmers have already begun to sponsor reforestation 
projects carried out by local associations and other civil society organizations, in which 
mangrove planters are often financially compensated for their participation. It is expected 
that such efforts will restore many of Ecuador’s degraded coastal wetlands that were 
converted for shrimp farming during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
(b) Common property and local resource rights  
 
Decentralization and devolution of ecosystem management to local communities 
for the promotion of environmental stewardship and social equity has been a central 
theme within the common property literature (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Antinori & 
Bray, 2005). One defining characteristic of Ecuador’s innovative coastal management 
policies has been the recognition of the “ancestral” rights of artisanal fishers in 1999, 
paving the way for 10-year mangrove concessions granted by the government to local 
associations throughout the coast. These new common property rights called custodias 
have two general aims: 1) to conserve and restore degraded mangrove areas; 2) to 
promote sustainable resource use and community management. Currently, 37,818 
hectares of mangroves are held in 41 concessions for community-based conservation 
(Rosero Moya & Santillan Salas, 2011). 
The local management of a custodia requires collective action on the part of 
individuals bound by a community or institutional affiliation. To qualify, a community or 
group of “ancestral users” must first organize into an association or cooperative officially 
recognized by the state. As an organization, they must then submit an application 
package consisting of maps, the names of officers, a list of members, a copy of the 
association’s agreement, and a management plan detailing the sustainable use of 
resources (Bravo, 2007). Similar to the system of co-management in Chile (Gelcich, 
Guzman, Rodriguez-Sickert, Castilla, and Cárdenas, 2013), the management plan of an 
Ecuadorian custodia is designed by the local fishing association in collaboration with an 
external NGO or university that provides technical assistance for a minimum of two 
years. In everyday use, these institutional arrangements function much like the common 
property regimes described by Ostrom (1990), in which members of the association work 
cooperatively to maintain a system of monitoring, sanctioning, and exclusion of outsiders 
over a particular resource domain collectively agreed upon by the association. Because of 
the benefits often cited, such as mangrove protection, sustainable resource management, 
local empowerment, and economic gains (Beitl, 2011; Bravo, 2007; Coello, Vinueza 
Burgos, & Alemán, 2008), several associations in El Oro Province have submitted 
applications for a custodia of their own. As an outcome of the multi-tiered institutional 
interactions between civil society and the Ecuadorian government, the custodias in 
Ecuador represent what some have called the “new commons,” in which newly 
recognized resource rights have great potential to transform human-environment 
relationships (Ruiz-Ballesteros & Gual, 2012).  
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 Some researchers argue that diverse outcomes of governance strategies are rarely 
analyzed together in the literature, and therefore there is no reason to assume that 
collective action institutions ensure sustainability, equity, and livelihood security to equal 
degrees (Agrawal & Benson, 2011). In a previous study of the cockle fishery, I found that 
one custodia in the province of El Oro was associated with larger catch and shell sizes, 
indicating ecological and economic benefits, but only for those members of the 
association who controlled access (Beitl, 2011). Nonmembers without access felt 
increasingly marginalized as mangroves were enclosed by shrimp farming on one hand 
and common property arrangements on the other (Beitl, 2012).  
 My previous study of the cockle fishery employed an institutional-level of 
analysis using the measure of success that Ruttan (2008) refers to as collective goods 
provisioning. This level of analysis does not capture whether individuals comply with the 
rules-in-use or if some other environmental factors are at play to promote larger shell and 
catch sizes. As Ruttan pointed out, it is important to be explicit as to how “success” is 
measured and distinguish between the collective action problem and the provisioning of 
goods, which are not necessarily related (Ruttan, 1998; 2008). In this paper, I turn to the 
collective action problem, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis, a more 
appropriate measure for capturing individual differentiation that helps explain the success 
or failure of collective action (Ruttan 2008).   
 
(c) Two kinds of collective action: contribution vs. subtractability 
 
The scholarly literature on collective action fundamentally points to two different 
kinds of collective action problems faced by individuals coordinating their efforts for 
collective benefit. The first kind of collective action problem refers to an individual’s 
contribution of time, money, or resources (Beard, 2007; Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965; Tilly 
& Tilly, 1981). Much of this research examines factors that facilitate or inhibit the ability 
of individuals to contribute to collective action, such as wealth heterogeneity, ethnic 
heterogeneity, social capital, and community size (Araral, 2009; Beard, 2007; Jones, 
2004; Ruttan, 2006, 2008; Waring, 2011).  Jones (2004) examines the effects of wealth 
heterogeneity on trust as a mediating factor affecting collective action, arguing that trust 
allows for more successful functioning among agricultural cooperatives in Ecuador. 
Beard (2007) also examines wealth in a multivariate regression of factors affecting 
contributions to collective action in Indonesia. She also found that social networks were a 
strong predictor of the ability of households to contribute to community development 
with implications for how benefits are distributed. In addition to multiple variables and 
societal constraints on collective action, institutions are often recognized for their 
mediating role (Araral, 2009; Folke & Berkes, 1995; Waring, 2011).  
The second kind of collective action problem is described in the commons 
literature as a subtractability problem, a situation in which extraction by one resource 
user is costly for the group and the exclusion of users is difficult (Acheson, 2011a; 
Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 1999; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 
1994). Rational choice theories about collective action in the commons stipulate that 
individuals have little incentive to cooperate or invest in resources when they are not 
rightful owners or when the costs of cooperating outweigh the benefits (Acheson & 
Gardner 2010; Ostrom, et al. 1994). Thus, a collective action dilemma refers to the ways 
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in which rational behavior by individuals results in a tragedy for the larger collectivity 
(Acheson & Gardner, 2010) or Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons. However, as 
noted by Folke and Berkes (1995: 123), individual decisions about resource use are 
usually mediated by social controls or sanctions. It has long been suggested that social 
interaction is embedded within the larger cultural ecological context (McCay, 2002; 
McCay & Acheson, 1987).  
 
(d) Conditions for collective action 
 
Much research on collective action has sought to understand the conditions under 
which decisions to cooperate are most likely. Institutions can serve as formal constraints 
(rules, laws, constitutions) or informal constraints (norms of behavior or conventions), 
which influence social interaction (Berkes, Folke, & Colding, 1998). For example, 
institutions often help define social interactions when actors do not share common goals 
or when power differentials are embedded within community relations (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999). Recent research has drawn attention to social networks (Beard, 2007; 
Crona & Bodin, 2006) and social learning (Biedenweg & Monroe, 2013) as structural 
conditions that influence social interaction.  
Corroborating numerous empirical studies on the crucial role of institutions, much 
experimental research has also shown that trust, reciprocity, reputation (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 1998; Ostrom & Walker, 2003) and the ability 
to punish defectors (Boyd & Richerson, 1992) are among the multiple factors that 
influence people’s willingness and ability to cooperate. Other researchers have argued 
that pro-social behaviors are rooted in our evolutionary past. From this perspective, 
human behavior is mediated through communication (Smith, 2010) or by an evolved 
psychological system based on repeated experiences that affect human emotion, guilt, 
friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, and 
trustworthiness (Kurzban, 2003; Trivers, 1971). Such socio-cultural contexts constitute 
what many researchers refer to as “informal institutions” (Berkes et al., 1998). 
 
(e) Linking social and ecological systems 
 
In addition to the socio-cultural context, some research on the commons has 
shown that certain characteristics of common pool resources make some more 
manageable than others, such as small size or definitive boundaries that facilitate the 
ability of groups to make collective choice agreements (Agrawal, 2001; McCay & 
Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). In some cases, a successful self-governing system may 
emerge from the ways in which resource users respond to environmental conditions 
(Basurto, 2005; 2008).  Thus, the sustainability of any governance system is contingent 
upon the biophysical state of the resource system (Basurto, 2008).  
Other research has shown that when resources are scarce, cooperative 
relationships may break down (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998; Laughlin, 1974). For 
example, Wutich (2009) has shown that water scarcity in an urban setting in Bolivia 
places external pressure on cooperative relationships within the community even when 
operational rules and collective choice agreements are well-established. Araral (2009) has 
found that in addition to multiple factors, water scarcity has a curvilinear effect on 
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collective action in irrigation systems in the Philippines. However, in their systematic 
review of case studies, Agrawal and Benson (2011: 205) note that surprisingly less 
attention has been given to biophysical factors of resources in the fisheries literature.  
In contrast to the multiple factors that break down collective action, other 
researchers have drawn attention to the importance of perceptions and common 
understandings, or what Russell Hardin (1982) may have classified as moral motivations 
for collective action. Some researchers argue that people must have a general sense of 
risk perception and awareness of the collective cost to avoid a tragedy (Burke, 2001), 
which also holds true for maintaining the strength of local institutions (Becker, 2003). 
Experience with resource decline also plays a role. For example, a conservation ethic 
emerged among lobstermen in Maine after a historical stock failure, allowing for the 
coevolution of new attitudes and cooperative behavior (Acheson & Gardner, 2010). Other 
researchers argue that cohesion under a collective identity is a necessary condition for 
collective action (Mosimane et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, motivations for collective action may not always be clear and 
not all forms of cooperation are in the interest of conservation. In her study of the 
management of mother-of-pearl shells in Indonesia, Ruttan (1998) found that villagers 
successfully cooperate and prevent free riding to defend access to fishing areas and 
ensure their own economic returns, but conservation is an epi-phenomenal outcome and 
not the result of intentional conservation. Such assertions challenge the assumptions 
about stewardship inherent in much of the common property literature. But as many 
researchers have pointed out, relatively few case studies have collected both biological 
and social data at the same time (Berkes, 2005; Pollnac & Johnson, 2005). More recently, 
researchers have made increasing efforts to link social institutions with environmental 
outcomes (Acheson, 1987; Bray, Ellis, Armijo-Canto, & Beck, 2004; Rustagi et al., 
2010; Persha, Agrawal, & Chhatre, 2011; Persha et al., 2010). These studies of the forest 
commons have been able to quantitatively explore the relationship between identifiable 
user groups with enforceable property rights and forest outcomes. But theoretical 
understanding about human-resource interactions at the individual level remains poorly 
understood (Janssen, 2010).  
 Simulating dynamic ecological conditions of differential resource renewal rates 
under controlled laboratory conditions, Janssen (2010) has found that individuals subtract 
from a common pool in ways that respond to these ecological dynamics. In addition to 
communication, he proposes that group identity formation and an individual’s 
commitment to cooperate also play a crucial role in the process of group formation and 
the development of strategies to avoid overharvesting. Gelcich et al. (2013) test for 
differences between already established user groups in the Chilean loco fishery. They 
show that members of fishing unions exhibit more pro-social tendencies and play the 
game differently than members of weak unions and nonmembers. Such findings from 
experimental research have profound implications for theories about collective action and 
the environment; however, most studies are based on hypothetical scenarios, even when 
conducted in the field (for example, see Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004 and Gelcich et al., 
2013). Based on their findings that experimental games do not robustly correlate with 
empirical observations, Gurven and Winking (2008) argue that the use of games as a 
methodological approach should complement, but not replace, ethnographic research. 
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 Drawing on ethnographic and fishery data from the field, my approach 
complements experimental research that systematically studies the effects of ecological 
dynamics on behavior (Janssen, 2010). Following Ruttan’s (2008) distinction between 
two ways of measuring the success of collective action, I hypothesized that collective 
action would have positive effects on common pool resources. As argued by Ruttan, the 
success of collective action may be measured by 1) collective action problem, or the 
degree to which individuals obey the rules-in-use or participate in the process or design 
of management regimes; or 2) collective goods provisioning, which measures the 
abundance, quality, or general condition of the resource base or institutions for 
sustainable governance. In this paper, I focus on the first distinction since I have 
addressed the effects of property arrangements on the cockle fishery elsewhere (Beitl, 
2011).  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
(a) Research design, hypotheses, and procedure 
 
The research design entails a mixed-methods approach using qualitative and 
quantitative data to study behavior toward two common pool resource systems, 
mangroves and the cockle fishery. Combining fishery data with ethnographic information 
about a population of cockle fishers across four study areas in coastal Ecuador, I explore 
how resource characteristics and the institutional context affect people’s behavior toward 
common pool resources. Based on the literature and exploratory field research, I 
developed the following hypotheses: 
H1: Contributions to collective action are explained by membership in local 
associations. I operationalize contributions to collective action as activities which may 
promote mangrove conservation and restoration. This hypothesis draws upon the data 
generated from informant responses on the questionnaire as to whether he/she had ever 
participated in mangrove reforestation projects, political demonstrations in defense of 
mangroves, workshops about mangroves or the cockle fishery, community development 
projects like those designed by government and non-government agencies for cockle 
mariculture, or a minga, which is a community work party organized in many rural areas 
throughout Latin America.  
H2: Members of associations are more likely than independent cockle collectors 
to perceive problems of overexploitation in the fishery. Given that socios are organized 
into groups, bound together under institutional affiliations, and connected to government 
agencies, I expect they have more access to information about the status of the fishery 
and therefore heightened levels of concern, which in turn, may influence their fishing 
behavior.  
H3: Membership in an association accounts for variation in average shell size in a 
fisher’s catch, reflecting more awareness and heightened levels of concern (see H2).  
Controlling for age, the number of small shells harvested as “seed” for mariculture, and 
environmental variables such as community size (a proxy for fishing effort) and lunar 
cycle, I predict that members of associations engage in conservation-oriented behaviors 
like respecting the shell size regulations. My preliminary research on the fishery 
Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem Beitl  
 10 
suggested a need to test these assumptions often made by government officials and socios 
about who engages in more “responsible” fishing practices.  
To test the hypotheses, I developed measures of sustainable fishing behavior and 
collective action that were appropriate to the ethnographic context of the mangrove 
cockle fishery in Ecuador. During the first phase of research involving observations in 
several communities and major ports for cockle landings, I designed and pre-tested a 
semi-structured questionnaire for cockle fishers. Many questions were based on 
theoretical constructs and my observations during the exploratory phases (Johnson, 
1998). Some questions were adapted from surveys created by the Instituto Nacional de 
Pesca (INP), Ecuador’s national fishery research institute. The final questionnaire was 
divided into the following sections: 1) information about cockles, including catch-per-
unit-effort (CPUE), shell length (mm), and sites of extraction; 2) baseline demographic 
information; 3) questions about change in mangroves and the fishery; 4) household 
livelihood strategies and participation in collective action. Basic demographic 
information included whether the informant was a socio and the name of the association 
to which he/she belonged. I coded responses to open-ended and semi-structured questions 
from the interviews to create measures of collective action. To qualitatively explore 
collective action as an outcome of local resistance to shrimp aquaculture, I created a 
supplemental set of questions for representatives from associations about their 
motivations for organizing and challenges they faced as a group.  
To operationalize human-resource interactions in the fishery, I created proxies for 
fishing behavior by calculating the mean shell length per individual catch, the proportion 
of a catch with shells below the legal size, and CPUE. Shell length is often used in 
fisheries science as a biological indicator of performance to determine the status of the 
fishery (Flores & Mora, 2011). For the purposes of this study, shell length averages per 
catch is an appropriate measure of “responsible fishing” since smaller shells indicate 
noncompliance with customary norms and regulations concerning the harvest. Shell 
length is a more appropriate measure of “responsible fishing” than CPUE, which may 
more accurately indicate foraging efficiency, rather than intentional conservation. 
These measures of collective action and human-resource interactions were 
designed to function in multiple contexts, across study areas, and under a variety of 
institutional arrangements to capture the complex interactions between institutions, 
individuals, and the environment. My attention to the ethnographic context under which 
civil society organizations began to flourish on the coast helps further explain the 
efficacy of collective action in environmental governance.  
 
(b) Description of population and study areas 
 
This paper draws on multi-sited ethnographic research from January 2009 to 
December 2010 in the provinces of Esmeraldas and El Oro on the Ecuadorian coast 
(Figure 1). After exploratory research in 13 communities and major ports, I selected four 
study areas to represent one urban area and one village in each of the two provinces: 1) 
Muisne (pop. ~7,000); 2) Las Manchas (pop. ~50); 3) Puerto Hualtaco (pop. ~40,000); 
and 4) Isla Costa Rica (pop. ~300). All study areas have been important centers for the 
marketing of mangrove cockles, but have lost more than 50% of their original mangrove 
cover since the 1980s.  
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(Figure 1 here) 
 
There are an estimated 5,000 cockle fishers dispersed throughout the five coastal 
provinces in Ecuador (MacKenzie, 2001). Cockle collecting has traditionally been an 
important household livelihood strategy, particularly in the provinces of Esmeraldas and 
El Oro where the majority of cockle fishers are located (INP, 1971). Today, cockle 
collecting is largely commercialized. Many collectors sell most of their catch to supply 
local and regional markets, keeping only a handful of small shells for personal 
consumption. Shells are typically gathered from the roots of mangrove trees during low 
tide periods and each fishing trip lasts about three hours. Spring tides (associated with 
full moon periods) have a longer lag time between high tide and low tide permitting 
fishers to work longer hours if they wish. Some fishers take advantage of the longer 
hours, particularly in Muisne, but most stay within the three-hour harvesting period. 
Spring tides also allow fishers to travel further out or deeper into the mangroves to reach 
areas that are normally submerged during neap tide periods.   
In Puerto Hualtaco, eight to nine motorboats carry up to 30 fishers (Monday 
through Saturday) to various sites along particular routes in the estuaries throughout the 
archipelago. With the exception of Hualtaco, most cockle collectors head out in small 
groups of friends or kin in motor-powered canoes, paddle canoes, or on foot to sites of 
their choice. Thus the average fishing effort, defined by INP as the total number of 
fishers on a given day, is higher in the urban areas of Hualtaco and Muisne (~200 and 
~75, respectively) than in the villages of Isla Costa Rica and Las Manchas (~23 and ~10, 
respectively).  
Membership in associations is considerably higher in the province of El Oro 
compared to Esmeraldas. In Esmeraldas, only 5% of those interviewed claimed affiliation 
(n=59) and in El Oro, 60% belonged to a local association or cooperative (n=93). In 
Esmeraldas, local associations of “ancestral users” focus their activities on mangrove 
conservation and defense. In El Oro, fishing associations collaborate with government 
agencies and focus on the development of the artisanal fishery sector. To date, there are 
no custodias in either of the two study areas in Esmeraldas. These new common property 
rights are the source of increasing tension among cockle collectors in El Oro (Beitl, 
2012). Such differences between the two provinces provide important comparative 
insights about the socio-political context for human-resource interactions.  
 
(c) Participant recruitment and data collection 
 
I administered the general questionnaire to cockle collectors orally after obtaining 
informed consent and permission to count and measure the length of all shells in their 
catch using a digital Vernier caliper (n=153). In the village of Isla Costa Rica, I recruited 
participants (n=58) often with the help of the president of the association and his wife 
after conducting a community census. In Puerto Hualtaco, local intermediaries, field 
assistants, and occasionally INP biologists helped me randomly select individuals as they 
disembarked from the boats returning from fishing trips as the tide was rising (n=33).ii In 
Muisne, my field guide, Adrian and I randomly recruited informants from a boat situated 
in the middle of the estuary at the end of the low tide period, offering refreshments and to 
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tow people’s canoes into port in exchange for their participation (n=47). On several 
occasions, we shuttled 10-15 cockle collectors to various sites, similar to the organization 
of labor in Puerto Hualtaco, but on a smaller scale. In the village of Las Manchas, Adrian 
and I recruited informants during five different visits (n=8), one of which we were invited 
to participate in cockle collecting with a local family.  
In the interviews, I enquired about perceptions of change in catch and shell size 
over the last 10 years, the reasons why they believed the fishery was changing, whether 
they were concerned about overexploitation, and whether they trusted that others obey 
size regulations. I further enquired about their participation in reforestation and other 
forms of collective action. The semi-structured questions always invited elaboration 
depending on time, perceived patience, willingness, and age of the participants. 
Immediately before or after the interview, I measured the length of all the shells in each 
individual’s catch, resulting in a sample of 12,433 cockles gathered from 71 cockle beds 
across the four study areas. I recorded the information with the help of one or more field 
assistants or a digital voice recorder. For each fisher’s catch, I calculated the mean shell 
length and proportion of shells below three size classes (45mm, 40mm, and 36mm).  
In each site, I conducted one or more focus groups to present preliminary results, 
verify the findings, and generate further discussion. Additionally, I gained much 
understanding about the ethnographic context through my extended home-stay in Isla 
Costa Rica, interviews and informal conversations with a variety of actors, and 
participant observation on fishing trips, events, and community meetings in all study 
areas.  
 
(d) Variables and data analysis 
 
Membership in an association (ASODUMMY) refers to present members, not 
including children of socios or former socios. My dependent variable, collective action, is 
represented by several proxy measures. I coded fixed responses from the interviews about 
collective action. The measures of collective action as a contribution are represented by 
five dichotomous dummy variables addressing the question of whether the informant had 
ever participated in reforestation, community mariculture projects, workshops, mingas, or 
political activism. I also coded free responses of informants when they offered to 
elaborate, resulting in a different n for certain questions since missing variables were 
dropped from the analysis (see Table 1).  
Using SPSS 17.0 statistical software, I employed a 2-way cross-tabulation 
appropriate for analyzing the relationship between two categorical variables. I used chi-
square likelihood ratio tests to explore whether there were statistically significant 
differences between socios and independents in their perceptions about mangroves, the 
state of the fishery, and their participation in different kinds of collective action. For 
continuous variables such as mean shell size, proportion of shells below legal size, 
number of shells gathered per hour, and age of the fisher, I used ANOVA.  
To explore other factors that account for variation in the mean shell length of each 
catch, I conducted an OLS linear regression analysis using the average shell length within 
each fisher’s catch (MEANTUB) as the dependent variable and proxy for fishing 
behavior.iii The regression model is an appropriate estimator since the dependent variable 
is normally distributed. Controlling for age of the collector, community size, lunar cycle, 
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and province, I used OLS linear regression to determine how institutional and 
environmental factors account for variation in fishing behavior. The two independent 
variables of theoretical interest include membership (ASODUMMY) and whether the 
informant trusts others comply with regulations (TRUST). Other independent and control 
variables are described below. 
Given the likelihood that the lunar cycle would influence characteristics of the 
catch, I recorded the date of capture and coded each observation as spring tide or neap 
tide (TIDEDUM) based on the tide table published by Instituto Oceanográfico de la 
Armada (INOCAR, n.d.).  Spring tides are characterized by extreme high and low water 
levels, as well as longer lag times between high tide and low tide periods. In contrast, 
neap tides under the new moon are shorter. Since Ecuador experiences a semi-diurnal 
tide, the two low tide periods occasionally fall within daylight hours during the new 
moon and some fishers seize the opportunity to work during both low tide periods.  
Community size (COMSIZE) can be considered a social or environmental 
variable. In the collective action literature, coordination is more difficult in large groups 
(Olson, 1965). However, some researchers have highlighted the mixed effects of group 
size on collective action (Yang et al., 2013). In the research presented here, group size is 
a less useful construct since this population of fishers is not necessarily bound together by 
a group. Thus the variable COMSIZE is more appropriately a proxy for fishing effort. 
According to INP, the average daily fishing effort in Hualtaco is 192 and in Muisne, it is 
55-80 individuals per day. Because of the relatively high fishing effort and classification 
as “urban” (see Figure 1), these two study areas were coded 1 for large community. In 
contrast, Isla Costa Rica with a daily fishing effort of 15-30, and Las Manchas with 10-
20, were each coded with a 0 for small community. I also included province to control for 
unobserved geographic differences between study areas (PROVINCE).  
In the two small communities, certain households practice mariculture, holding 
live cockles in net enclosures in the estuary near their houses until they reach a larger size 
or seasonal demand raises the market price. Collectors from those households often 
harvest a number of shells smaller than 45mm as seed for their holding pens. Given the 
likelihood that this practice affects the average shell size of each person’s catch, I 
included the number of shells that were collected for mariculture (NUMCORRAL).  
Finally, to further test the effects of ecological constraints on harvesting behavior, 
several cockle fishers allowed me to measure their shells gathered from two or more sites 
on different occasions (n=20). I used ANOVA to determine whether differences in shell 
sizes gathered by the same individual on separate fishing trips were significant.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
(a) Mangroves and contributions to collective action 
 
Membership in local associations fosters a higher propensity of individuals to 
contribute to different kinds of collective action (Table 1).  Socios participate more than 
independents in mangrove reforestation, community mariculture, workshops, mingas, and 
political activism related to the defense of mangroves. It is no surprise that the 
differences are statistically significant since many of these kinds of activities are 
organized by civil society institutions for their members, often in collaboration with other 
Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem Beitl  
 14 
sectors (government, NGOs, or private shrimp farmers). Civil society institutions serve as 
a social network that facilitates the flow of information, which may ultimately allow for 
successful community-based management (Crona & Bodin, 2006).  
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
There are some incentives for individuals to contribute to collective action. As 
mentioned earlier, many sponsors of reforestation projects offer a modest remuneration 
equivalent to expected earnings from a fishing trip. In this way, mangrove planting has 
evolved from a form of “symbolic resistance” during the early 1990s (Veuthey & Gerber, 
2011) to new forms of multi-level institutional collaboration (Berkes, 2002). However, 
even when there are no incentives like payment for participation, sometimes participation 
is voluntary. Those who participate explain they are doing it for the greater good, for the 
benefit of mangrove conservation, or because of their obligation as a socio. Some are 
incentivized by the desire to maintain a good reputation as collaborative and dependable 
among their peers. In the interviews, many socios expressed great pride in their ability to 
collaborate with one another, government officials, or researchers like myself. Thus, 
there are often social pressures among socios to participate, particularly in the smaller 
communities where mingas, community organizations, and other collective activities are 
part of daily life and an obligation for everyone. These findings corroborate experimental 
research on collective action that emphasizes the importance of trust, reciprocity, and 
reputation (Ostrom and Walker, 2003). 
With financial support from international donors, activist organizations in Muisne 
and Quito have been organizing public awareness events and demonstrations against 
policies that have favored the shrimp industry since the early 1990s. While not all cockle 
collectors recognize any benefits to participating in political demonstrations, many 
expressed their feeling of empowerment now that they are able to make their voices 
heard. Demonstrations are sometimes organized locally, but many often take place in the 
capital city. For many cockle collectors who subsist on $5-20 a day, it is difficult to travel 
and show support for these efforts. However, the NGOs organizing the events invite 
members of associations throughout the coast to participate by covering their travel costs 
and food expenses. Similarly, the local NGO in Muisne often supplies meals and pays for 
the travel costs for socios from distant villages to participate in workshops. In contrast, 
government agencies typically do not offer any compensation for participation. As such, 
many associations in the province of El Oro and just a few in Esmeraldas raise their own 
funds to send one or two representatives to events or workshops organized by 
government agencies.  
Independent cockle collectors give multiple reasons for not participating. Many of 
the independents I interviewed said they did not know about events or were not “invited.” 
In some interviews, I sensed some resentment in comments like, “they (the sponsors) 
already have their people picked out” in reference to who is invited to participate; and 
“only sabidos work in reforestation,” implying that members of associations are 
conniving and corrupt.  Some independent cockle collectors were interested in 
participation, but did not have the money to pay membership dues to the local 
association, reflecting the ways in which economic constraints can present barriers to 
collective action (Beard, 2007). As one informant expressed, “They do not tell us (about 
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reforestation projects) because we are the poorest of the poor, but yes, I would go…” 
Others were interested, but were highly distrustful of local institutions, asserting they 
hoard money for themselves and “always ask for collaboration but never give anything 
back.” Overall, many independent cockle collectors in both provinces do not have the 
time, resources, information, trust, or interest in contributing to these kinds of collective 
action.  
General suspicions among many independent cockle collectors about institutions 
were more prevalent in Esmeraldas where several informants expressed their overall 
disappointment in the ability of the local NGO to effect change. After confirming that I 
was not affiliated with the NGO in the interviews, several informants confided their 
belief that the NGO was “profiting from the poor.” I often heard the argument that they 
“used” local people to advance their own interests, receiving large sums of international 
donations while many cockle collectors remained destitute in the face of a declining 
resource. Another critique was that they created certain levels of dependency among the 
local associations who would not voluntarily participate without incentives. These 
findings lend further support to the notion that trust is a crucial factor behind successful 
collective action (Cook & Cooper, 2003; Eckel & Wilson, 2003; Jones, 2004). They 
further represent the ways in which grassroots movements may sometimes become 
further disconnected from local needs as they are increasingly scaled up and integrated 
into global networks (Igoe, 2003).  
 
(b) Environmental motivations mobilizing collective action 
 
While civil society organizations serve as a context for collective action, they 
simultaneously represent an outcome of collective action from a historical perspective. 
Civil society began to flourish on the Ecuadorian coast throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s when many people in coastal communities organized around social justice issues in 
response to environmental degradation associated with shrimp farming. Some informants 
in Muisne, Esmeraldas commented that they had participated in reforestation and 
activism in the past when shrimp farms first began to encroach and there was a stronger 
sense of trust in community organizers. They nostalgically recounted stories of 
subversion when artisanal fishers and activists joined forces in the late 1980s to resist the 
powerful shrimp industry, break pond walls and dykes, and threaten shrimp farmers with 
machetes. However, as people increasingly lost confidence in the NGO and its affiliated 
associations, the spirit of community activism also disintegrated. Among many 
independent cockle collectors in Muisne today is a sense of hopelessness and resentment 
against the very same activists who fervently advocated their cause many years ago. 
Today Muisne, divided between hope and indifference, is a difficult place for the local 
NGO to encourage participation. On the other hand, even one of its biggest critics in 
Muisne mused, “Without collective action, if we hadn’t formed a group to resist shrimp 
farming, we would have no mangroves today,” recognizing the NGO’s vital role in the 
struggle over resource distribution conflicts.  
In El Oro, many fishing associations similarly started out with the goal of 
defending their livelihoods. Today, these institutionalized forms of collective action play 
an important role in village life. As one community leader in Isla Costa Rica explained in 
his own words, “Collective action is the backbone of small communities with little 
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material wealth.” Other associations in Puerto Hualtaco organized for similar reasons in 
the face of rapid mangrove deforestation that threatened so many livelihoods. Now 
artisanal fishers in El Oro enjoy the benefits of government support in the form of credits, 
subsidies, and for some associations, custodias. As such, the sense of hopelessness and 
rampant individualism I observed in Muisne, Esmeraldas is much less pronounced in the 
province of El Oro where fishers generally enjoy a higher standard of living, better prices 
for their catch, and the benefits of government support. This point further draws attention 
to the crucial role of the social-political context, which helps further explain the efficacy 
of collective action.  
Mangroves throughout the Ecuadorian coast are now on a path to recovery 
through reforestation projects, custodias, awareness campaigns, and other 
institutionalized forms of collective action. However, such motivations for mobilizing 
raise important questions about whether the intentions of collective action are for 
economic gain or restraint in the interests of conservation (Lu, 2001; Ruttan, 1998). This 
may have less to do with the nature of the group and whether they are unified under a 
collective identity (Mosimane et al., 2012), share a common understanding of risk 
perception (Burke, 2001; Becker, 2003) or conservation ethic (Acheson & Gardner, 
2010) and more to do with the characteristics of the resource system (Agrawal, 2001) and 
the type of collective action problem at hand (Schlager, 1994).  
 
(c) Fishing and the subtractability problem 
 
The subtractability problem that characterizes the fishery is more difficult to 
overcome. Many socios are critical of independent cockle collectors, contending they 
lack awareness and understanding about the urgency of coastal resource decline. They 
believe independent fishers are free riding off the hard work and collective efforts of 
socios who sacrifice their time and energy for the greater good of resource conservation. 
Since they are the ones that attend workshops and take time to become informed about 
resource issues, many socios believe that independent cockle collectors lack awareness 
and do not respect the size regulations or customary rules in fishing. However, several 
proxies for “responsible fishing,” such as the mean shell length of each fisher’s catch and 
the proportion of shells below the legal size of 45mm, show indistinguishable behavior 
between socios and independents (Table 1). While on average, socios gather more shells 
per hour of harvest, this does not necessarily reflect a conservation ethic. On the contrary, 
it could be a function of access to better gathering grounds like custodias that restrict 
public access or areas with a lower fishing effort like smaller communities.  
Table 1 also shows that both socios and independents have a shared awareness of 
risk perception (Burke, 2001) and perhaps some degree of a conservation ethic (Acheson 
& Gardner, 2010). Both socios and independents acknowledge that the fishery has been 
under pressure over the last 10 years (Table 1). However, socios are slightly more 
concerned about the future and differ more strongly in their opinions about potential 
solutions. This finding may reflect the ways in which information is disseminated and 
shared among members of a social network (Crona & Bodin, 2006), or in this case, the 
ways in which collective understanding is formed in a group bound together by 
institutional membership.  
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(Table 2 here) 
 
(Table 3 here)  
 
Despite slight differences in opinion about the urgency of fishery decline, the 
regression results show there are no significant differences in fishing behavior between 
socios and independents even after controlling for unobserved geographical differences 
between provinces, lunar cycle periods, community size, and the number of cockles taken 
as seed for mariculture (Table 3). Trust that others respect the rules also makes no 
difference in harvesting behavior, although this could be due to the fact that most cockle 
collectors are distrustful of other collectors in general. For both socios and independents, 
fewer than 30% of cockle collectors trust that people cooperate in the commons. 
However, for many socios, trust is conditional—that only other socios can be trusted.  
Despite perceptions about how others interact with common pool resources, more 
than half of the cockle collectors I interviewed claim they personally abide by the rules-
in-use by leaving smaller shells (>45mm) in the mangrove for the benefit of resource 
regeneration. However, there is also an indirect economic incentive for leaving small 
shells. Even though merchants pay by the number rather than by the size of shells or 
weight of the catch, the price is often negotiated based on subjective perceptions of 
“quality,” or an eyeballed estimate of shell sizes and the proportion of a catch made up of 
A. tuberculosa, the species considered more palatable by many consumers.  
On the other hand, several informants, both socios and independents alike, 
justified the collection of a handful of small shells for personal consumption to 
completar, or reach a certain goal. Traditionally before fishery regulations were 
implemented in 2001, keeping a handful of rechazos (non-marketable cockles) has long 
been considered acceptable under customary norms. However today, both socios and 
independents are worried that competition among fishers has resulted in the problem that 
smaller shells are beginning to appear on the market. As one collector in Hualtaco 
commented, “nobody gives the gathering grounds a rest anymore because if they do, 
someone will come along tomorrow.”  Another man from Muisne expressed similar 
frustration, “the problem is that if I don’t take the small shells, someone else will come 
along and do it, so it’s better that I take everything for myself.” In the two small 
communities Isla Costa Rica and Las Manchas, cockle fishers justified the collection of 
smaller shells as “seed” for mariculture. Thus, there is little incentive to follow the rules-
in-use based on the anticipated behavior of others in the commons, despite one’s 
perception of risk (Burke, 2001; Becker, 2003), conservation ethic (Acheson & Gardner, 
2010), or communication through a social network (Crona & Bodin, 2006). Contrary to 
other research on collective action (Araral, 2009; Folke & Berkes, 1995; Waring, 2011), 
these results suggest that institutions have very little mediating effect on this kind of 
collective action problem. As Schlager (1994) interestingly noted, the “appropriation 
externalities” or the subtractability problem that characterizes many fisheries, is quite 
different than other kinds of collective action problems.  
 
(d) Subtractability and environmental constraints 
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The results of the regression analysis further suggest that environmental variables 
are more important than characteristics of the fishers or the institutions that 
hypothetically mediate their behavior. Shells harvested in the two large communities with 
a higher fishing effort tend to be 1.78mm smaller. This finding is not surprising since a 
higher fishing effort is often associated with harvesting pressures (Flores & Mora, 2011). 
The lunar cycle also has a significant effect on shell size. Cockles harvested during spring 
tides are 1.35mm larger, which is not surprising since spring tides allow people to work 
longer hours, travel further out, or reach areas normally submerged during neap tides. 
However most cockle collectors work three hours regardless of the lunar period, at least 
in Puerto Hualtaco where the nine boats operate on regular three-hour schedules.  
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
Figure 2 corroborates the results from the regression analysis, suggesting that 
people harvest whatever the environment provides despite their conservation ethic or 
membership in an association. The ANOVA tests show significant differences in the 
average shell length and large-to-small shell proportions per catch, depending on the site 
of extraction for 15 out of 20 individuals who allowed me to measure their shells on more 
than one occasion. Within these environmental constraints, each collector gathers what 
the environment provides, regardless of whether he/she is a socio or not. Thus, behavior 
is situational, highly dependent on the environmental context, and most likely responding 
to ecological dynamics (Janssen, 2010), which are not fully captured here. 
Furthermore, both socios and independents express interest in respecting the shell 
size regulations of 45mm, but many feel they have no choice but to completar in order to 
make ends meet and support their families. Such decisions to break the rules reflect 
rational choice perspectives that conservation is too costly (Acheson, 2011b). Contrary to 
findings by Boyd and Richerson (1992), the threat of confiscation by authorities is not 
enough to deter noncompliance. On the contrary, intermediaries awaiting the cockle 
collectors in the port frequently use their cell phones to warn fishers returning from the 
mangroves when the authorities are present. These increased levels of communication in 
the presence of authorities illustrate the ways in which communication and cooperation 
may sometimes operate against the interests of conservation (see Ruttan 1998). On the 
other hand, noncompliance with the rules concerning size regulations in the fishery 
commons often goes unnoticed. Few are able to observe such forms of non-cooperation 
in the commons. Those who witness rule-breaking understand the challenges of 
harvesting cockles under ecological constraints and would not likely turn their friends or 
kin over to the authorities.  
Finally, membership in an association may increase one’s access to community-
managed gathering grounds with larger catch and shell sizes (Beitl, 2011), which lends 
further justification for the creation of more custodias as common property regimes that 
locally regulate access. Significantly more socios than independents believe that 
custodias are a viable solution to overexploitation (37% compared to 5% respectively), 
but there is still a lot of disagreement about the fairness concerning the enclosure of a 
public good (Beitl, 2012).  
 
 




The purpose of this paper is to address gaps in the literature concerning the ways 
in which resource characteristics and institutional context influence people’s behavior 
toward common pool resources. The main contribution of this paper is the use of both 
ethnographic and fishery data to explore human-resource interactions within two different 
resource systems, highlighting the differential nature of collective action problems.  My 
findings suggest that both kinds of collective action problems (contribution and 
subtractability) are similar for the common theme of sociality and such social relations 
are reinforced by a group identity, such as institutional membership. Trust is a unifying 
factor behind both kinds of collective action problems (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). Just as 
a lack of trust discourages compliance with rules in the commons, a lack of trust in 
institutions discourages participation. This research has also shown other aspects of 
sociality that promote collective action (i.e. communication, social obligation, collective 
perceptions of risk, commitment to collective goals, and the enforcement of sanctions) 
operate differently depending on the resource system or level of analysis. This finding 
suggests that attention to resource characteristics merits further study to advance theories 
about collective action and governance of the commons (Janssen, 2010; Agrawal & 
Benson, 2011; Basurto, 2008; Wutich, 2009).  
The ambiguous effects of collective action concerning mangroves and their 
associated artisanal fisheries are best explained in light of the different characteristics of 
the resource systems, their distinct social histories and local explanations for decline, and 
the differential nature of collective action problems. Both mangroves and their fisheries 
in Ecuador represent two kinds of common pool resources, but the historical reasons for 
their depletion are distinct. Fisheries are a classic commons problem characterized by 
subtractability and excludability, in which rational extraction by one user is costly for the 
group and the exclusion of users is difficult (Feeny, Hanna, McEnvoy, 1996; Ostrom et 
al., 1999). As a different kind of common pool resource system, the sustainability of 
mangrove forests in Ecuador has been undermined for different reasons. Largely 
undervalued for the prospect of export-led growth promised by shrimp aquaculture, about 
one-fourth of Ecuador’s mangroves have been converted into shrimp farms since the 
1980s (Bailey, 1988; CLIRSEN-PMRC, 2007; Martinez-Alier, 2001). As a consequence, 
fishers are generally united in their belief that shrimp farmers have been responsible for 
the destruction of mangroves, but more divided in their perceptions about who is 
responsible for the decline of fisheries. A sense of social solidarity and collective 
responsibility has had less time to develop in the case of the cockle fishery, which has 
only begun to experience pressure in the last 10 years. Given these different social 
histories of each resource system, the coordination of individual actions is faced with a 
different set of challenges concerning agreement over the underlying causes of resource 
degradation.  
The second explanation for mixed effects of collective action is related to the 
nature of the collective action problem (Hardin, 1982; Schlager, 1994). Membership in 
institutions encourages participation in activities that uphold the goals of mangrove 
conservation, as well as the management of common property regimes like custodias. 
Members of associations contribute to collective action for multiple reasons: 1) for their 
obligations as socios; 2) to uphold their reputations as collaborative, dependable, and 
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trustworthy; 3) for their fear of sanction for not following rules or group agreements; 4) 
for their access to information about events and encouragement by their peers to 
“collaborate” or participate; and 5) for their pride as members of associations and 
ancestral users of mangroves. However, the subtractability problem that characterizes the 
fishery is more difficult to overcome. Collective concern that the fishery is under pressure 
is not necessarily unique to socios, but such perceptions have not yet translated into 
practice in the broader population at the individual level. This research suggests that 
harvesting behavior is highly situational and dependent on ecological constraints. Both 
socios and independents alike are concerned about declining shell sizes, but feel they 
have no choice but to harvest whatever the environment provides, regardless of their 
membership in any institution or conservation ethic. This economic reality is not readily 
captured in experimental research (Janssen, 2010; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Gelcich et 
al., 2013; Ledyard, 1995) where common pool resource dilemmas are hypothetical and 
material economic returns are not at stake. While experimental research yields powerful 
conclusions about decision making in the commons, it should not replace ethnographic 
field studies of human-resource interactions; rather the two methodological approaches 
have great potential to build theories about collective action in a complementary fashion 
(Gurven & Winking, 2008).  
One way to address the subtractability problem or “appropriation externality” 
(Schlager, 1994) would be to increase the devolution of property rights to local 
associations through the creation of more custodias that restrict access and operate 
around periods of closure. However, improved resource conditions associated with 
custodias may be more a function of ecological conditions produced by management 
practices, rather than a reflection of “responsible fishing” by individuals, as this paper has 
argued. Moreover, enclosing the commons for the benefit of particular groups raises 
concerns about fairness, especially since there are often tradeoffs among outcomes of 
ecological sustainability, livelihoods, and equity (Beitl, 2011; 2012; Agrawal and 
Benson, 2011). Furthermore, while institutions encourage participation in mangrove 
restoration, it remains unclear how these human dimensions contribute to social-
ecological change and how the benefits of mangrove restoration are distributed. Better 
understanding of ecological processes is needed to determine the relationship between 
mangrove recovery and fishery productivity. If institutions are promoting more 
participation among artisanal fishers in the process of mangrove recovery, then how are 
the benefits distributed back to fishers? What other socio-economic dynamics affect 
fishing effort and individual adaptations to changing environmental conditions? A 
systematic study of the fishing effort is needed to explore livelihoods and other 
conditions under which individuals leave the fishery and alleviate pressure on resources 
over time. Such further investigation comparing individual and collective adaptations to 
environmental change would contribute to better understanding of human-resource 
interactions at multiple levels and scales for building adaptive capacity and resilience 
(Adger, 2003; Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004; Berkes, et al., 2003; Endter-Wada & 
Keenan, 2005; Nelson, et al. 2007). 
A common policy prescription in the commons literature has emphasized a need 
to create institutions for collective action for the sustainable governance of resources 
(Gibson & Becker, 2000; Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom, 1990; Ruiz-
Ballesteros & Gual, 2012; Smith & Berkes, 1991). My findings suggest another reason to 
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move beyond panaceas and prescriptions for common pool resource management 
(Basurto & Ostrom, 2009). While civil society plays an increasing role in environmental 
conservation and local empowerment (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002; Little, 1999), not all 
citizens have the interest, resources, or trust motivating them to participate. Implications 
for resources under such conditions of heterogeneity and larger scales cannot be 
understated. The commons are not always easily bound by institutions or communities. 
Fostering trust and solidarity among the larger population cockle fishers in Ecuador who 
all universally share a stake in the fate of the dynamic mangrove commons will continue 
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i Executive Decree No. 1391 of the 15 of Octubre 2008, published in Registro Oficial 454 de 27 de octubre 
de 2008.  Under this executive decree, shrimp farmers had until March 31, 2010 to submit their application 
to legalize their lease occupying historical mangrove areas under the condition that they relinquish a certain 
percentage of their shrimp farm depending on the year of its construction and the total area occupying 
former mangrove habitat. For example, if the shrimp pond illegally occupies 10 ha of mangroves or less, 
the farmer would be responsible for reforesting 10%. For 11-50 ha of illegal occupation, he must reforest 
20%. For 51-250 ha, he must reforest 30% within a year from submission of the application. Shrimp farms 
occupying areas declared as protected areas by the Ministry of Environment must be vacated immediately 
at the cost of the shrimp farmer, unless its construction took place before the area was formally declared 
protected.  
ii Of the 36 recruited in Puerto Hualtaco, only three declined to participate.  
iii All statistical analyses were conducted only for A. tuberculosa since it is ecologically more abundant and 
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Participation/ contribution to collective action       n  n 
Participation in reforestation (%) * 58 83 83 54 
Participation in community mariculture projects (%) * 28 71 53 51 
Participation in workshops (%) * 18 68 73 40 
Participation in a minga (%) * 68 65 98 42 
Participation in a political march in defense of mangroves and 
livelihoods or fisheries (%) *  43 76 88 49 
     
Perception and opinion regarding state of mangroves and fisheries    
Perceive difference catch sizes over the last 10 years (%) 87 76 96 55 
Believe a difference in catch is explained by lack of awareness (%) * 15 62 37 52 
Concerned about the future of the fishery (%) * 78 74 96 52 
Claim to always leave small shells in the mangrove (%) 68 73 62 52 
Trust that others leave small shells in the mangrove (%) 20 65 27 44 
Not everyone has the right to work in mangroves: it is ok to exclude 
some fishers (%) 12 68 25 44 
Believe custodias are beneficial for the resource (%) * 62 53 85 47 
Suggest custodias are a potential solution to overexploitation (%) * 5 61 37 46 
Believe that people respect the boundaries of custodias (%) 29 24 28 43 
     
Other descriptive statistics     
Age * 32.48 69 38.74 54 
Shells gathered per hour * 24.05 74 32.71 43 
Shell length per catch (mm) 45.34 75 45.64 43 
Proportion of shells in catch <45mm (%) 52 75 50 43 
Proportion of shells in catch <40mm (%) 20 75 20 43 
Proportion of shells in catch <36mm (%) 3 75 4 43 
 
* Differences are significant at p < 0.05 level. 
a Chi-square likelihood ratios were performed on categorical variables and analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
tests were performed on continuous variables to test for statistically significant differences between socios 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
 
 
Dependent Variable      
MEANTUB Mean shell length in each fisher's catch (mm) 118 45.45 2.591 38.14 52.11 
       
Independent variables      
ASODUMMY Member of association 118 0.36 0.483 0 1 
AGE Age of fisher 118 31.85 14.075 8 70 
COMSIZE Size of community 118 0.59 0.493 0 1 
TIDEDUM Lunar cycle (spring tide) 118 0.27 0.446 0 1 
PROVINCE 
 
Fixed effects to control for unobserved geographical 
heterogeneity 118 0.58 0.495 0 1 
NUMCORRAL Number of cockles used for mariculture 115 2.08 8.280 0 72 
TRUST Trust that other users comply with rules-in-use 98 0.13 0.341 0 1 
Valid n=95      
 






Table 3. OLS regression results for fishing behavior (MEANTUB) 
 
Predictor Coef. SE Coef. T P 
 
 
     
(Constant) 47.099 0.840 56.102 0.000 
Member of association 0.367 0.659 0.556 0.579 
Age of fisher -0.008 0.020 -0.415 0.679 
Size of community -1.821 0.578 -3.152 0.002* 
Lunar cycle (spring tide) 1.455 0.549 2.652 0.010* 
Fixed effects to control for unobserved 
geographical heterogeneity -1.261 0.631 -1.999 0.049* 
Number of cockles used for mariculture -0.081 0.030 -2.684 0.009* 
Trust that other users comply with rules-
in-use 0.475 0.777 0.611 0.543 
 
N = 94, R2 = 19.9%, R2 (adj) = 13.4%, p = 0.006. 
* Significant at p < 0.05 level.  
 
Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem Beitl  
 31 










































































































Figure 2. Differences in mean shell length of an individual’s catch by fishing trip (n=20) in the provinces of  (a) Esmeraldas 
and (b) El Oro. S=socio, IND=independent. 
* One or more indicators significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
